A new behavioral model of rational choice in social dilemma game

سال انتشار: 1398
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: انگلیسی
مشاهده: 238

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شناسه ملی سند علمی:

JR_JNCOG-0-1_004

تاریخ نمایه سازی: 21 شهریور 1400

چکیده مقاله:

In this article, we show how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions. We interpret the players’ behavior with the help of the concept of hyper-rationality. These interpretations help to enlarge our understanding of the psychological aspects of strategy choices in games. With the help of this concept can be analyzed social sciences and society based on the cognitive psychology approach such that human society can be understood easily and predicted more fluently. In addition, we introduce a new game in which there is a dilemma that this dilemma occurs in most societies. We investigate this dilemma based on the claim that each player is hyper-rational. In this dilemma, a weak trust has been created between players, but it is fragile. In many cases, our study provides a framework to move towards cooperation between human decision-makers.

نویسندگان

Madjid Eshaghi Gordji

Semnan University

Gholamreza Askari

Semnan University

Choonkil Park

Hanyang University, Seoul, South Korea