In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing values at the heart ofPhilosophy of Mind
محل انتشار: مجله فلسفه اسلامی، دوره: 1، شماره: 1
سال انتشار: 1400
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: انگلیسی
مشاهده: 129
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شناسه ملی سند علمی:
JR_JTIS-1-1_002
تاریخ نمایه سازی: 18 دی 1401
چکیده مقاله:
"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable bifurcation. Instead of such a splintered, divided concept of the person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that a person, while he is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can survive the death of the body), functions as a united, embodied being in this life. Embodiment consists of six nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and affective incorporation. This united concept of an embodied person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human nature. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue.
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