An Adamsian Theory of Moral Obligations but without Divine Commands

Theological Voluntarism is the view according to which certain moral properties or statuses have to be explained in terms of God’s commands, will, or other voluntary states of God. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy criticizes theological voluntarism in general and Adams’ divine command theory of the nature of moral obligations in particular. Furthermore, he puts forward the first sketches for a theory of moral obligation that is not voluntaristic. In this paper I will first introduce Murphy’s proposed theory and will show that it is implausible. Then, drawing on Adams’ views of the nature of goodness and virtue, articulated in Finite and Infinite Goods and A theory of Virtue, I will try to put forward the first sketches of a viable theory of moral obligations that does not appeal to divine commands in explaining moral obligations and explains them in terms of goodness/badness. An important feature of morality that voluntarists appeal to for motivating their view and criticizing views that explain obligations in terms of goodness is the existence of supererogatory actions, i.e., actions that are good but not required. I will focus on this feature of morality and try to show how a theory of moral obligation that explains the obligations in terms of goodness can accommodate this feature.