A new behavioral model of rational choice in social dilemma game
محل انتشار: مجله شناخت عصبی تکاملی، دوره: 1، شماره: 1
سال انتشار: 1401
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: انگلیسی
مشاهده: 99
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شناسه ملی سند علمی:
JR_JNCOG-1-1_004
تاریخ نمایه سازی: 29 خرداد 1402
چکیده مقاله:
In this article, we show how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions. We interpret the players’ behavior with the help of the concept of hyper-rationality. These interpretations help to enlarge our understanding of the psychological aspects of strategy choices in games. With the help of this concept can be analyzed social sciences and society based on the cognitive psychology approach such that human society can be understood easily and predicted more fluently. In addition, we introduce a new game in which there is a dilemma that this dilemma occurs in most societies. We investigate this dilemma based on the claim that each player is hyper-rational. In this dilemma, weak trust has been created between players, but it is fragile. In many cases, our study provides a framework to move toward cooperation between human decision-makers.
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نویسندگان
Madjid Eshaghi Gordji
Department of Mathematics, Semnan University P.O. Box ۳۵۱۹۵-۳۶۳, Semnan, Iran
Gholamreza Askari
Department of Mathematics, Semnan University P.O. Box ۳۵۱۹۵-۳۶۳, Semnan, Iran
Choonkil Park
Department of Mathematics, Hanyang University, Seoul, South Korea